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The ambition in what follows is to begin a consideration of the lessons that might be 
learnt from a reassessment of 20th Century avant-gardist practice within the domain of 
musical composition. The goal here will not be an evaluation of the compositional 
outputs of this period but, rather, some reflections on the place and role of teaching 
within and amongst the musicians themselves; remembering that many of them gained 
a considerable reputation as teachers: Schoenberg, Messiaen, Stockhausen and Cage 
being the preeminent examples. 
 
And, as an aside, before too quickly assuming that the radical newness and futurism 
associated with much avant-gardism is somehow at odds with our educational 
institutions, we should acknowledge the extent to which, if nothing else, the 
vocabulary of the avant-garde has long since come to dominate the promotional 
language and marketing jargon of the university itself. Everything is now cutting edge, 
innovative and revolutionary; we are all expected to re-new ourselves eternally; as 
every Vice-Chancellor proclaims: ‘education is transformation’—forget that ever-
present cliché at your peril! Forever making everything that we once argued was new, 
old in the name of a new newness that must then await its own future oldness...and so 
it goes...newer and newer: ‘forever young’ as Bob Dylan might say—remember him? 
The longstanding debates about the ‘future of the university’ going back to the young 
Nietzsche and beyond are now brushed aside by the bold claims of the ‘university of 
the future,’ one that in the aspiration to become ‘future-proof’ (more jargon) 
effectively removes the futurity of the future leaving us with the same old newness; 
what Deleuze would describe as diversity rather than difference.  
 
That by way of preamble. 
 
So, and not forgetting his involvement with the musical avant-gardism of his own day, 
Nietzsche’s 1872 text On The Future of Our Educational Institutions (1909) is above 
all else concerned with listening, not to what is said but, rather, to what remains unsaid 
in the said (sotto voce) and then what is yet beyond (or other than) that. Nietzsche 
writes: 
 
One speaking mouth, with many ears, and half as many writing hands—
there you have to all appearances, the external academic apparatus; the 




The proprietor of this mouth is severed from and independent of the 
owners of the many ears; and this double independence is 
enthusiastically designated as ‘academic freedom.’…except that behind 
both of them, at a modest distance, stands the State…to remind the 
professors and their students from time to time that it is the aim, the goal, 
the be-all and end-all, of this curious speaking and hearing procedure.2  
 
Behind the freedom then, so celebrated by academia and the avant-garde alike, lies the 
State; meaning that it will be necessary to free ourselves from that freedom in order to 
‘hear’ the calling of another/different future beyond or outside of the future such 
freedom appears to create. Gary Schapiro captures exactly this point in his essay on 
Nietzsche’s lectures. Drawing attention to what he calls the ‘weightiness’ of the word 
‘On’ (Uber) in the title, he continues by suggesting that ‘beyond’ rather than ‘on’ 
would better translate the significance of this otherwise insignificant word: 
 
‘Beyond the future’ might suggest that the future of Bildungsanstalten 
(educational institutions) is already inscribed in the machinery. That 
future, given its determined place in a series of legitimizing 
metanarratives, is already a past. We can see that future all too 
clearly…The task perhaps is to think beyond that future. To do so we 
must think beyond the politico-narratological principles that 
circumscribe the enormous and still burgeoning series of reports, 
conferences, studies and research projects that bear titles that are variants 
upon ‘the future of the university.’3  
 
And, we might add, ‘the university of the future.’ 
 
In short, there is a need and demand to renew our concepts of the new and the future 
that, together, circumscribe our conception of what is yet to come. To make this 
possible Nietzsche believes that it is necessary to introduce art into the university, not it 
should be emphasized as a simple addition to the curriculum, but rather as a radically 
different manner of thinking and, one presumes, teaching. He writes: 
 
In what relationship these universities stand to art cannot be 
acknowledged without shame: in none at all. Of artistic thinking, 
learning, striving and comparison, we do not find in them a single 
trace…4 
 
It is here that Nietzsche’s involvement with the musical avant-garde, his own 
musicianship and, above all, what might be called the very musicality of his thinking 
and writing takes on significance. As is clear throughout his work ‘artistic thinking’ is 
in essence a form of listening, hence his obsession with ears. It is this aspect of his 
thinking/listening that allows us to link him to John Cage, to whom we now turn.  
 
The self-appointed task of Cage, if we might call it that, was to teach people how to 
listen: not to his ‘teachings’ (he didn’t have a ‘teaching’ as such) and certainly not to 
his music or even music in general for that matter. No, for him music (as it is normally 
heard) is precisely what gets in the way of listening. If avant-gardism often has an 
emancipatory dimension, which it does, then the emancipatory consequence of Cage’s 
work is a freedom-from musical listening coupled with a freedom-to truly hear what is 
there to be heard. But can this be taught? That is the question. 
 
If much of teaching is by example and through examples, then how does the teacher 
provide examples of the radically new without simultaneously betraying the very 
novelty that is sought? For example, if one looks at the first wave of European musical 
avant-gardism—the Viennese School—we find a teacher and two students: Schoenberg, 
Berg and Webern and we have, if not a doctrine or theory, a method of composing that, 
in its adherence to strict laws, is capable of being taught. But therein lies the issue: 
while Schoenberg was universally celebrated as a teacher (rather than as a composer!) it 
is common knowledge that he was the last person to study with if you wanted to engage 
with the avant-garde of which he himself was at the forefront. Always quick to reject 
his dubious reputation as a ‘revolutionary,’ Schoenberg was at pains to root his own 
compositional methods and discoveries in the unbroken evolutionary path traced back 
(by him) through Mahler, Brahms and Wagner to Beethoven, Mozart and Bach. 
Hegelian rather than Kantian, Schoenberg himself set an example not by adhering to 
self-imposed maxims but, rather, by developing a method of composing that, while 
new, was nevertheless the continuation of a strict style that could be traced back 
through history and indeed gained its authority from that very history. Consider this 
passage from Schoenberg’s Style and Idea:  
 
[Atonality] called into existence a change of such an extent that many 
people, instead of realizing its evolutionary element, called it a 
revolutionary…I always insisted that the new music was merely a logical 
development of musical resources….And perhaps the greatest surprise 
may have been the fact that my Harmonielehre did not speak very much 
about ‘atonality’ and other prohibited subjects but almost exclusively 
about the technique and harmony of our predecessors…5 
 
Famously, and as unlikely as it might seem, John Cage was a student of Schoenberg’s 
describing him as his greatest (and probably only) teacher within the musical realm, and 
as a ‘brilliant musical mind.’ That said, his stories of Schoenberg’s music classes make 
for disturbing reading: 
 
Schoenberg asked a student to play the piece on the piano. She said it 
was too difficult for her. “You’re a pianist?” She agreed. “Then go to the 
piano.” On the way, she said she would play slowly in order not to make 
mistakes. He said, “Play at the proper tempo and do not make mistakes.” 
She began. He stopped her: “You’re making mistakes!” She began again. 
He stopped her: “You’re not going fast enough!” After several tries, each 
of which he interrupted, she burst into tears, explaining between sobs 
that she had been to the dentist that morning and had a tooth pulled out. 
Schoenberg: “Do you have to go to the dentist in order to make 
mistakes?”6  
 
And another brief snapshot from Cage: 
 
He was capable of laying down the law. In counterpoint classes, the laws 
he gave were no sooner followed than he demanded they be taken less 
seriously. Liberties taken, he’d ask: Why don’t you follow the rules? He 
kept his students in a constant state of failure.7 
 
Those were the days! 
 
And yet Cage genuinely idolized Schoenberg throughout his life, never missing an 
opportunity to remind everyone that it was Schoenberg who got him to ‘devote his life’ 
to music and to ‘banging his head’ against the wall of harmony which, as Schoenberg 




The very idea of a ‘mistake’ would quickly become anathema to Cage once acceptance 
of everything that chance offered became his guiding principle. Questions of obedience 
and transgression (quickly punished); of problems and solutions; of right and wrong; 
friends and enemies, all of this Schoenbergian paranoia seems so remote from the 
‘sunny disposition’ (as he so often describes it himself) of Cage. So what did he learn 
from Schoenberg his teacher?     
 
To begin with, and even though his guiding principles were, as said, radically different, 
the very idea of having underlying principles at all comes, in part at least, from 
Schoenberg. Another Schoenberg snapshot: 
 
Schoenberg sent everyone to the blackboard. We were to solve a 
particular problem he had given and to turn around when finished so that 
he could check on the correctness of the solution. I did as directed. He 
said, “That’s good. Now find another solution.” I did. He said, “another.” 
Again I found one. Again he said, “another.” And so on. Finally, I said, 
“There are no more solutions.” He said, “What is the principle 
underlying all your solutions?”8 
 
Of course, the idea of exhausting all solutions within a Cagean world is absurd, but 
nevertheless, as is all too clear in reading Cage’s copious writings, he does indeed 
adhere to principles which, while non-law-like, do require a high degree of discipline 
which, as was often the case amongst orchestras performing his music, when ignored 
resulted in a serious devaluation of his work. Sunny disposition aside, Cage was utterly 
scathing when it came to the undisciplined and unprofessional performance of his 
apparently undisciplined work. Much of his own teaching was concerned with exposing 
and rectifying this inability to ‘hear’ or sense the source of these underlying principles. 
 
One more thing: in spite of the intense expressionism and, indeed, ego-mania evident in 
Schoenberg’s very post-romantic work, the imposition not only of discipline and 
underlying principles but of an objective impersonal law of composition introduced an 
anti-humanist, indeed inhuman quality into his music which, in its alienating neutrality, 
is wholeheartedly embraced by Cage, at least from his Music of Changes onwards. His 
words on the latter are revealing: 
 
 The Music of Changes is an object more inhuman than human, since 
chance operations brought it into being. The fact that these things that 
constitute it, though only sounds, have come together to control a human 
being, the performer, gives the work the alarming aspect of a 
Frankenstein monster.9 
 
Interestingly, Cage like Schoenberg is even now frequently celebrated as primarily a 
teacher/guru/writer rather than as a proper composer (an absurdity not to be discussed 
here) but, unlike Schoenberg whose avant-gardism as we have seen did not extend to 
his teaching, Cage’s pedagogical practices, of which there were many, are quite 
different. Just as a contrast consider the following memoir of being in one of Cage’s 
classes.  
 
Each student was obliged to present their work to the rest of the class, however the 
decision on who should make such a presentation was determined by chance 
operations, one of Cage’s central principles of course. One particular student took 
exception to this as, repeatedly, chance determined that she was not to present her 
work. As the first day progressed she frequently complained to Cage who nevertheless 
stuck to his principles and allowed chance to do its work. On the following day, the 
same again, and once again the student began her complaints, however on this occasion 
Cage stopped the class, turned to the student and said: “OK, you’re quite right, present 
your work.” 
 
It is hard to imagine Schoenberg caving-in like that but then, all appearances aside; this 
is not the essential area of difference between them. In fact it is here they are closest 
pedagogically. As already observed, both were men of high (albeit different) principles. 
Where Schoenberg places intentionality at the very center of his aesthetic and, thus, at 
the center of his teaching, Cage devoted his life to removing intentionality from the 
creative and, thus, the teaching situation: hence his use of chance but also, as in this 
case, the chance encounter with the intentionality (or ‘will’) of another to which he 
submits. Or, more accurately, accepts: ‘acceptance rather than composition’ being one 
of his central credos. Intentionality assumes goals and goal orientation, what we would 
call ‘learning outcomes’ in the academic world: Cage’s pedagogy renounces such goals. 
Here he is in conversation with Daniel Charles in a section from his essay ‘From the 
Birds’: 
 
Cage: If I pursue anything, it is the absence of a goal… 
 
Charles: Therein is what must be the difficulty of being a student of John 
Cage! How could you have students, and teach them without goals?[...] 
 
Cage: Recently…I offered a class…with… the hypothesis that we would 
not know what we were about to study and that we would not divide 
ourselves into students and non-students; but that all of us, myself 
included, would be students. 
 
Charles: What happened? 
 
Cage: We subjected the library to chance operations, and in groups of 
about a hundred [and we complain about excessive student numbers!!], 
each one performed two chance operations to determine the works he or 
she should read. Then, by drawing lots, we formed flexible groups: each 
group was to meet and exchange information on what everyone had 
read….freshening information by means of information.10  
 
Clearly, Cages classes were no more about chance composition than Schoenberg’s were 
about atonality or twelve-tone composition, but the key difference is that his pedagogical 
method allowed for the creation of chance and/or indeterminate situations from out of 
which a teaching took place. But what kind of teaching is this and what exactly is being 
taught? 
 
Firstly, and returning to the central concept of ‘listening,’ who listens to whom in a 
teaching situation where all become students as Cage describes it above? As any teacher 
knows well, pretending to be a student—‘one of them’—rarely works because, like it or 
not, our knowledge economy invests the teacher with an authority (warranted or not) that 
is almost impossible to shake off. And even the ‘ignorant schoolmaster’ as described by 
Rancière,11 does not offer a solution to this problem given that the so-called ignorance of 
the ignorant schoolmaster is only subject-specific (French, the piano, 
trigonometry…etc.): localized. Beneath this surface ignorance, the ignorant schoolmaster 
knows perfectly well that ignorance is a proven road to knowledge. This knowledge 
remains unshaken, as does the authority that accompanies it. 
 
Cage’s pedagogy is much more radical. By completely removing the linearity of 
ignorance to knowledge and the associated pursuit of intentional goals, and replacing this 
with a flattened and neutral structure of infinite information, equally available to all—
teacher and student alike—he effects a dramatic expansion of what might be called the 
zone of listening, one that explodes the teacher/student and student/student (peer to peer) 
model rooted in either a regime of mastery or an ethics of dialogue. As Walter Benjamin 
observed in his famous essay The Storyteller12 through the course of history (and not 
only in the modern age) the story is progressively replaced by information with a 
consequent diminution of the powers of listening. For him, the storyteller speaks from 
out of his or her own experience, giving counsel to those who listen and come to an 
understanding of the story through an interpretive process rooted in their own experience: 
a kind of hermeneutical dialogue. Essential to this process is the absence of explanation: 
Benjamin writes: 
 
Actually, it is half the art of storytelling to keep a story free from 
explanation as one recounts it…the psychological connections among the 
events are not forced on the reader. It is left up to him or her to interpret 
things the way he or she understands them, and thus the narrative 
achieves an amplitude that information lacks.13 
 
As a contrast to this, information, Benjamin claims, is ‘understandable in itself’14 
precisely because it is already ‘shot through with explanations.’15 This, for him, is 
responsible for the decline in listening. 
 
Cage sees things completely differently. For him it is precisely the great storytellers (or 
the great composers in his examples, particularly Beethoven) who in forcing the 
infinitude of sound into the finitude of ‘their’ music or ‘their’ story effectively rob the 
listener of the ability to hear sound in itself, ‘understandable in itself’ and, as Cage often 
expresses it, from within its ‘own center.’  
 
To the extent that he offers a pedagogy devoid of explanations and explication, Cage 
bears some resemblance to Rancière’s ‘ignorant schoolmaster,’ but this similarity is 
deceptive. While it is true that Rancière is the sworn enemy of the teacher as explicator, 
coming between the student and the text, he nevertheless remains in thrall to the 
authority of the text itself as the fount of a knowledge that is by no means inexplicable 
but, rather, perfectly explicable albeit (the important point) without the interference of the 
teacher as explicator. So, once again, this is by no means a pedagogy of ignorance or 
inexplicability as it would seem, but quite the opposite. By describing his pedagogy as a 
‘freshening’ of information by information itself Cage completely removes (because 
already ‘shot through’ with explanations) the necessity of explanation and, in so doing, 
radically transforms the role of the teacher: but how? 
 
Trying to imagine a teaching situation such as Cage describes, where random 
information arrived at by chance is exchanged (rather than shared…you cannot share 
what you do not own, and here perhaps we approach the ‘event’ of education) without 
explanation or interpretation requires us to think outside of the epistemological, 
dialogical and hermeneutical categories that continue to dominate pedagogy; all ‘depth’ 
models that have to a large extent superseded the ‘height’ model of teaching proposed 
most radically by Levinas in Totality and Infinity. If anything, we might describe Cagean 
pedagogy as a breadth model, something that, through the acceptance of an information 
society, links him to Benjamin who does not in fact see this completely negatively as the 
following passage from a short piece on ‘The Newspaper’16 confirms: 
 
Thus, science, belles lettres, criticism and literary production, culture and 
politics, fall apart in disorder and lose all connection with one another. 
The scene of this literary confusion is the newspaper; its content, 
“subject matter” that denies itself any other form of organization than 
that imposed on it by the reader’s impatience….Hand in hand…with this 
indiscriminate assimilation of facts goes the equally indiscriminate 
assimilation of readers, who are instantly elevated to collaborators. Here, 
however, a dialectical moment lies concealed: the decline of writing in 
this press turns out to be a formula for its restoration in a different one. 
For since writing gains in breadth what it loses in depth, the conventional 
distinction between author and public…is disappearing in a socially 
desirable way…at the scene of the limitless debasement of the world—
the newspaper—that its salvation is being prepared.17  
 
Without succumbing to Benjamin’s characteristically redemptive language, it is perhaps 
here that we can begin to identify an essential moment of teaching within an imagined 
Cagean pedagogy; the moment where the disorder and confusion, or what Cage would 
describe as the anarchy of disconnected information offers up a new space or breadth of 
possibility outside of culture, the cultural hierarchies and the educational institutions that 
give us the teacher/student; composer/listener: artist/viewer; writer/reader dichotomies. 
Instead of using education to impose order on chaos, rendering it explicable through the 
imposition of stories and narratives that allow us to take ownership of the world around 
us and wield power and authority over those less knowledgeable or educated than 
ourselves, the exchange of randomly selected information as described by Cage is (unlike 
‘knowledge exchange’) not strictly speaking exchange at all given that, to repeat, such 
information is not properly in the possession of—owned by—those who have been 
submitted to it, whether by chance (as in this instance) or not. In the class described, 
Cage’s students (and himself) were the subjects of a fourfold determination analogous to 
what for him are the four elements of a composed work: Structure, Method, Form and 
Materials. He describe these in turn as follows: 
 
• Structure: the division of the whole into parts. 
• Method: the note-to-note procedure. 
• Form: the expressive content. 
• Materials: the sounds and silences of the composition. 
 
Let’s see what happens if we think of both teachers and students as performers within a 
situation (a learning situation) composed of the above elements. 
 
Structure. Returning to the Cage class: the ‘hypothesis’ (different to intention?) was to 
‘not know what we were about to study,’ an indeterminacy that at the level of structure 
however is strictly determined beforehand. Here we immediately see a radical departure 
from the spoken and unspoken humanism that continues to dominate pedagogical 
theory and teaching practice in our supposedly post-humanist age. As with his Music of 
Changes, the use of chance at the level of structure effectively removes the human 
(whether knowing or ignorant) from the determination of the teaching situation. To use 
the language of Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, whatever 
choices are made within the method, form and materials of the situation, they are 
secondary to the a priori decisiveness of the structure itself.  
 
To be sure, it is scarcely possible to come near the essence of decision 
without…starting again with the human being, with ourselves. Then we 
think of ‘decision’ as choice, resolution, the preferring of one thing and 
the setting aside of another, and we end up with freedom as a cause 
and a capacity. We divert the question of decision in the direction of 
‘morals’ and ‘anthropology’…18 
 
What is decision anyway? Choice? No; choosing always concerns only 
something pre given, something that can be taken or rejected. Here de-
cision means grounding and creating, disposing in advance and beyond 
oneself…19 
 
This helps explain why Cage always insisted that you cannot improvise at the level of 
structure hence his skepticism towards improvisation, something that echoes (for the 
same reason) Nietzsche’s skepticism towards so-called ‘academic freedom’ (and 
improvisation for that matter). Indeed, the latter’s recognition of the decisive structure 
of the State beneath and within all teaching practice (and the choices available and 
made) is shared by Cage and his suspicion of the university system: 
 
Charles: At the university…I have the impression that certain of your 
students learned quite a bit from you. 
 
Cage: In any case…they taught me that I’d rather not teach. 
 
Charles: And yet you haven’t really renounced all pedagogic activities? 
 




Cage: They’re too intimate with the governments, be it in France where 
nothing occurs without an official’s stamp on it, or in America, where 
the authority is private: but it comes to the same thing, doesn’t it?20  
 
In the face of this, Cage, like Nietzsche, was committed to introducing art into the 
university not, to repeat, as an agreeable addition to the curriculum at the level of 
method, form and materials but at the level of structure. What this meant for both of 
them was emancipation from human determination in the form of an affirmation of fate 
and chance respectively. It is often forgotten that, for Nietzsche, the ‘strongest’ form of 
the will to power is the will not to will; Cage’s pedagogy shares this acceptance of the 
unwilled or non-willed as the following response to Daniel Charles confirms. 
 
Charles:  Then your teaching…could be defined as a pedagogy of non-
volition? A detachment in relation to the will? 
 
Cage: A progressive detachment, yes, that will not fall back into 
attachment. A detachment that will repeat nothing.21 
 
Clearly, for Cage, such a detachment from the will cannot take place at the level of 
choice, within the teaching situation. Rather, teaching must take place within a structure 
that is already in place and unwilled by the participants: decisive. And, to respond to the 
obvious objection, it is not a question of Cage willing the unwilled—an intentional 
unintentionality—but, as he says himself: ‘the question is not one of wanting, but of 
being free in relation to one’s own will.’22 For him, it is this exemplary freedom that 
allows him, as teacher, to reveal rather than impose the determination of chance at the 
level of structure. This revelation is something close to the very event of teaching to 
which we will return.  
 
Method. In Cage’s class, as described, the ‘monstrous’ inhumanity of chance is a 
given, untainted by the subterranean interference of the State. Having said that, in order 
for a teaching situation to arise and function pedagogically, a method is required, one 
that is chosen either by the teacher alone, or with the students or, indeed, by the 
students alone: these choices take place within the situation and are intentional. At the 
level of method then the class is determined. But it should be recognized that, unlike a 
methodology that by definition exceeds the parameters of any specific teaching 
situation, method can be improvised on the spot in response to the immediate situation 
and its specific relation to the chance structure that underpins it. Analogous to the 
‘note-to-note procedure’ of a musical composition, the organisation of an actual class 
requires, for its duration at least, what Blanchot (speaking of method) calls a ‘mode of 
progressing,’23 one that is not absolute, has no Absolute to progress towards, but is 
rather an ‘incessant’ movement that must discipline itself in the absence of a singular 
goal and its associated laws. Not to be disciplined by the will of self or other requires an 
equal force of discipline as a method to avoid the re-attachment to the will, this perhaps 
is where we can begin to see the first fruits of Cage’s teaching. 
 
Form. Unusually, Cage does not distinguish form and content but, rather understands 
form as itself ‘expressive content.’ For him, form, unlike structure, comes into being 
performatively as the giving of a particular form to an underlying structure: something 
close, perhaps, to Deleuze’s actualization of the virtual. But as Cage explains in his 
lecture on indeterminacy, form can be either determinate or indeterminate, which means 
that in addition to performatively giving form we must also consider performatively 
accepting form, something much more in keeping with Cage’s non-intentionalism. This 
raises an issue regarding his conception of form as ‘expressive content.’ While we are 
familiar with the idea of giving as an expressive act, this is not the case with accepting 
where causality and determination contrive to thwart any expressive potential. This 
challenges us to re-conceive of expression as a non-subjective, non-intentional event: 
something more akin to the expressivity of life itself. Deleuze tries to grasp this 
peculiar modality of expression through a transformed notion of causality, what he 
describes as ‘quasi-causation’ and the expressive relation between events rather than a 
characteristic of subjective human acts. 
 
On the one hand, event-effects maintain a relation of causality with 
their physical causes, without this relation being one of necessity; it is 
rather a relation of expression. On the other hand, they have between 
them, or with their ideational quasi-cause, no longer a relation of 
causality but rather, once again and this time exclusively, a relation of 
expression.24  
 
He continues with a passage that beautifully captures the expressive relations assumed 
by a Cagean sound world/event. 
 
…an aggregate of noncausal correspondences which form a system of 
echoes, of resumptions and resonances, a system of signs—in short, an 
expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a necessitating causality.25  
 
Thought pedagogically rather than compositionally, it is at the formal level that those 
within a teaching situation are either given or not given the opportunity to exercise 
choice as regards the unfolding shape of the teaching process. It is not clear from 
Cage’s description of the class we are considering exactly what the instructions were 
once the groups of students were actually in the library gathering their information, but 
it is probable that this performative moment introduced indeterminacy into the 
situation; for the sake of argument let us imagine that to be the case. While it is clear 
what such indeterminacy contributes to the performance of a musical composition—
variation, difference, expressive possibilities and a degree of freedom…etc.—it is by no 
means as clear what it might contribute to an unfolding learning situation: Cage himself 
offers no explanation or rationale. However, what he does offer is a description of the 
three most likely responses of a performer (or student for us) when faced with 
indeterminacy and the necessity of choice.  
 
First, the performer/student might proceed in an organized way that creates a 
comprehensible and communicable form that is capable of analysis. This, one assumes, 
is close to our dominant pedagogies which tolerate indeterminacy as long as it results in 
determinate (analyzable) ends or assessable learning outcomes.  
 
Second, the student might respond arbitrarily in what Cage describes as an inward 
direction, following the dictates of the ego, the unconscious whether individual or 
collective, ultimately determined by the universal force of human instinct: and thus 
communicable if not analyzable. One might recognize this as a familiar counter-
movement to the inherent rationality of the previous response, one that remains human-
all-too-human. 
 
Third, and most Cagean, is the choice of what he describes as a movement outwards: 
 
Or he may perform his function…arbitrarily, by going outwards with 
reference to the structure of his mind to the point of sense perception, 
following his taste; or more or less unknowingly by employing some 
operation exterior to his mind: tables of random numbers, following the 
scientific interest in probability; or chance operations…26 
 
What all three options or models of choice have in common is that they are all 
determined: the first by an objective analytics, the second by a subjective, intentional, 
expressivist aesthetics, and the third by what might be called a neutral, non-intentional 
fatalism. It is, of course, the last of these three that posed the greatest challenge to the 
musical orthodoxy in Cage’s lifetime, and it continues to do so now both as music and 
as a teaching. 
 
Amongst other things, the above is a reminder that Cage always made a clear 
distinction between two things that have often since been confused: chance and 
indeterminacy. For him chance operations can produce works that are absolutely 
determined or absolutely undetermined, in this chance is no different to design in its 
possible outcomes. That said, the interplay of chance and indeterminacy at the formal 
rather than the structural level must be the key moment in any re-thinking of both 
performance and pedagogy as an avant-gardist practice. 
 
Imagine yourself in Cage’s class; you are now in the library, which has now become a 
performative space. The form of this space has been rendered indeterminate by prior 
chance operations and thus the ‘expressive content’ of this form is now dependent upon 
your response to the indeterminacy. Using Cage’s threefold typology of choice, you 
might ‘proceed in an organized way’ like, for instance, Sartre’s ‘autodidact’ in Nausea 
who is working his way through the library from A-Z;27 or you might move ‘inwards,’ 
follow the arbitrary dictates of you ego and subjective taste, thus gravitating towards 
sections of the library that feed your own interests and desires; or you might move 
‘outwards’ and introduce arbitrary chance operations again that having nothing to do 
with your own mind or body and thus nothing to do with your own interests and/or 
expertise. Reflection on the choices we make is at the heart of this pedagogy, as is the 
acceptance of the outcomes particularly where chance has been allowed to intervene. 
 
Choice one will introduce into the classroom, once the library has been excavated, 
something approximating a body of organized knowledge that can be learnt: a familiar 
scenario. 
 
Choice two will introduce into the classroom a plethora of opinions, viewpoints, 
commitments, beliefs and ‘positions’ that can be debated, challenged, believed or 
rejected: a familiar scenario. 
 
Choice three will introduce into the classroom random information that, in its neutrality 
and absence of human agency and predilections, is incapable (certainly within the 
parameters of a single class) of either providing knowledge and understanding or of 
sparking any meaningful debate: a very unfamiliar scenario that, in our system, would 
no doubt give an external examiner much to condemn!  
 
But is it so unfamiliar? As a general principle, especially outside of the arts, the answer 
must be yes. Even within the arts, to the extent that the arts have been subsumed within 
the university system as a ‘professional’ as much as (or even more than) a creative 
practice, the answer must still be yes. But, that said, for anyone who has spent any time 
with practicing artists, across any discipline within or outside of a teaching situation it 
soon becomes evident that, what Niklas Luhmann describes as the ‘emancipated 
contingency’28 of the creative act maps much more convincingly onto the Cagean 
exchange of random information than it does the dominant pedagogical model of 
empathic dialogics and instrumental knowledge exchange. For many artists it is not a 
question of whys or wherefores but, rather, of (as Beckett says) this is ‘how it is:’ take 
it or leave it. Discussion of art works is largely redundant not because they are 
ontologically inexplicable but, quite the opposite, because they are already ‘shot 
through with explanations’ which is what brings them into existence in the first place. 
In this regard, returning to Benjamin’s terminology, artworks resemble information 
more than they do stories. Of course, the academic world conceived, as it is, as an 
interpretative community will always strive to transform information into this or that 
story; that is what allows the dominant dialogical/narratological pedagogy to exist and 
persist. But the fact remains that, while artists might not be very good at interpreting 
their own work (it varies) they are often very good at explaining their work. The reason 
why such explanations, grounded as they are in a rightly discredited concept of artistic 
intentionality, are generally mistrusted or ignored is that they provide us with little 
more than information. No one but a fool would restrict the meaning of an artwork to 
the intentionality of an individual artist, but we are not talking about meaning, we are 
talking about the coming into being of the artwork: it’s creation—that’s what the artist 
can explain. And the point: how is this so different to the monstrous inhumanity of a 
pedagogy ruled by chance events? As Cage is quick to remind us, for all of the horror 
of chance operations, they are in fact simply a re-duplication of the longstanding 
dictatorship of the artist/genius and the transformation of their contingent and arbitrary 
intentions into laws to be learned and obeyed. Let us re-cite Cage’s earlier passage on 
The Music of Changes with the next sentence added. 
 
The Music of Changes is an object more inhuman than human, since 
chance operations brought it into being. The fact that these things that 
constitute it, though only sounds, have come together to control a human 
being, the performer, gives the work the alarming aspect of a 
Frankenstein monster. This situation is of course characteristic of 
Western music, the masterpieces of which are its most frightening 
examples, which when concerned with humane communication only 
move over from Frankenstein monster to Dictator.29 
 
What art education generally fails to confront is that, shot through with intentions and 
thus explanations that are themselves rooted in chance, artworks, while allowing 
infinite interpretation, are locked into the absolute finitude of chance that brought them 
into being: yes, anything can happen but in the contingency of the moment this 
happened: that’s how it is.   
 
Material. This, remember, concerns the ‘sounds and silences of a composition.’ Notice 
the terminology, no mention of music or its components, harmony, melody, rhythm 
etc., and certainly no mention of composers, genres or styles: just sound and silence. 
Transposed into our pedagogical thinking and the materiality of the teaching situation 
understood, in this instance, as the neutral exchange of random information, we find 
ourselves in a learning environment devoid of the usual, ethical, dialogical, humanistic 
assumptions that continue to underpin our pedagogical hegemony. Just as Cage 
repeatedly stated throughout his life that ‘sounds are not men and men are not sounds,’ 
(and it is men and women who, by attaching themselves to particular sounds, transform 
them into music: ‘their’ music), so in the same vein teachers with their will-to-
knowledge, their will-to-explicate, their will to persuade, their will to indoctrinate take 
possession of the sounds and silences of the teaching situation, transforming the 
random noise of information into ‘their’ theories, ‘their’ positions, ‘their’ beliefs. What 
kind of noise would issue from a classroom where both the teacher and the students 
were dispossessed and forced to acknowledge that every sound comes from what Cage 
describes as its ‘own center:’ no conductor/teacher/dictator/explicator in the center with 
students huddled around that center, in the same tiny space beating to the same time, 
but an infinitely expanding periphery of information, unowned but endlessly 
exchangeable: what Deleuze and Guattari, discussing Cage, describe as a form of 
‘floating.’30 I hear a buzzing, a cacophonous din that, over time, I learn to hear 
differently, a transformation of listening that emancipates or detaches me from my will 




What Cage describes as ‘freshening’ has nothing to do with the infinite renewal 
associated with hermeneutical appropriation and reappropriation, of hearing the same 
thing differently and then differently again in an infinite variation that displaces the real 
difference of difference with what Deleuze would describe as the mere ‘diversity’ of the 
same.31 The sounds and silences associated with such ‘freshening’ cannot be located in 
or limited to the human voice and the mouths and ears of the speaking-hearing 
community described by Nietzsche at the outset; just as the ‘expressive content’ of 
form described by Cage cannot be restricted to human expression alone. Instead we 
need to try and imagine a pedagogy—an avant-gardist pedagogy—where the 
educational value and transformative potency of the ‘new,’ while retaining its authority, 
is no longer harnessed to human ingenuity and individual creative innovation but is, 
rather, witnessed as a moment in the revealed co-presence of an infinite multiplicity of 
centers. Each center has its own sound and each sound has its own value, but without a 
singular value system to validate or invalidate any one of them; only the ever-
proliferating structures, methods, forms and materials necessary for the fateful 
emergence and collision of different bodies of information to take place. Here the ‘new’ 
is liberated from the tragi-drama of post-romantic individualism and the anti-pedagogy 
at its core—‘original genius cannot be taught’—and reinstated as a process or re-newal 
or re-freshening which has nothing to do with either creative or interpretive originality 
but with something closer to the origin and what might be called the originarity of 
sensation in the broadest terms, or more specifically ‘listening’ as it figures in the 
thought of Cage.  
 
Sensation does not speculate, originate or innovate, nor does it interpret, explain or 
judge; sensation accepts. Passive rather than active, it is affected by what is already 
there, the given, the ‘there is’ (Il y a) to use Levinas’s terminology. And, to draw upon 
Deleuze’s ‘logic of sensation,’ to sense is not just to be affected by what is immediately 
there in actuality, but also potentially by the virtuality of an infinitely multiplicitous 
being that is ‘vertically’ co-present with the localized horizontality of ‘actualization.’ It 
is this co-presence that allows Deleuze to conceive of passivity as a form of creativity 
just as, in turn, Cage regards acceptance as a form of production, albeit one 
emancipated from the ‘dictatorship’ of the composer and his or her compositions. What 
is produced? For both of them, not new works but new space-times. Just as with Cage’s 
chance-determined class discussed above, Deleuze and Guattari (most particularly in A 
Thousand Plateaus) create space-times, territories, zones, lines and so on, not through 
the painstaking creation of bodies of knowledge to be learnt and understood by the 
reader, but by colliding disparate chunks of predigested information and accepting the 
results. ‘We will never ask what a book means…we will not look for anything to 
understand in it.’32 This, the affirmation of chance, is what they share with Nietzsche, 
Mallarmé and John Cage.  
 
If chance does ‘freshen’ information, not by human interpretation or explication but by 
the acceptance of everything’s co-presence with everything else, then we must also 
accept (as teachers and students) the consequent drop in the pedagogical temperature: 
freshness requires coldness. In Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game (one of Cage’s 
favorite books incidentally) there is an interesting passage where Tegularius witnesses 
the transformation of his friend, the hero of the book, Joseph Knecht. 
 
From Knecht’s look, it was clear that his remoteness and objectivity 
were not pretence, but uncannily genuine, and that the man before him 
who treated him with this matter-of-fact courtesy, accompanied by 
intense intellectual alertness, was no longer his friend Joseph, was 
entirely a teacher and examiner…enveloped and isolated by the gravity 
and austerity of his office as if by a shining glaze which had been 
poured over him in the heat of the fire, and had cooled and hardened.33 
 
Notwithstanding Cage’s ‘sunny disposition’ then, the dark, cool and somber places 
associated with his lifelong search for mushrooms might, perhaps, give us a different 
insight into the real complexities of his character as a composer and teacher. Behind the 
winning smile that accompanied his infinite acceptance of the given remains the 
Nietzschean strength of will necessary not to will or what Heidegger describes as the 
‘resoluteness’ necessary for ‘letting-be’ (Gelassenheit). In an age when the 
student/client expects the teacher to be parent-figure, counselor, psychoanalyst and, 
above all, friend, don’t be fooled by Cage’s ‘hypothesis’ that all, including himself, 
should be students within the space-time of his chance teaching environment. Such a 
gesture does not introduce one shred of intimacy, togetherness or communal warmth 
into the situation because it is not a question of the distance between one person and 
another but, rather, the distance between one block of information and another, one 
product of chance and another, all immune to interpretation, explication and 
understanding: This is a distance that can be sensed but not explained and which, as 
sensation, has the potential to reveal the event of education itself, something that has 
little if anything to do with knowledge or ignorance, understanding or 
misunderstanding, comprehensibility or incomprehensibility, and all of the other 
pedagogical binaries that separate teacher and student while secretly tying them together 
in a pedagogical embrace rooted in the animal warmth of empathy and dialogue.  
 
The ‘freshening’ of information by information is more chilling, it prolongs life, 
reinvigorates, renews and reawakens by separating life from the possessive grasp of 
human and withdrawing into the inhospitable regions of what Maurice Blanchot calls 
‘the neutral’ and Brecht, in his pedagogy of distance and distancing, the ‘alienated.’ 
While it true that the clarion call of many avant-gardist movements was the re-
introduction of ‘art into life’ and life into art, Cage (who felt the same) recognized that 
merely bringing art as it is into life as it is seriously misses the point. For him, as for 
Marx, the point was not to interpret (or re-interpret) the world, but to change it. 
Anarchist rather than Marxist, Cage sought to do this by accepting rather than rejecting 
the world, and in so doing, allowing it to change itself. This might almost be considered 
a form of passive aggression, but with one major difference: passive aggression operates 
within the world as it is; passive creativity (to return to Deleuze’s concept) creates or 





The event of education does not take place in the classroom, not even in John Cage’s 
classroom, in fact, especially not in John Cage’s classroom. As Deleuze proposes, the 
event never actually takes place at all, has no place in the here and now, being that 
which has always already happened and, simultaneously, that which has yet to happen. 
 
The event…has no present. It rather retreats and advances in two 
directions at once, being the perpetual object of a double question: 
What is going to happen? What has just happened? The agonizing 
aspect of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time 
something which has just happened and something about to happen; 
never something which is happening.34 
 
This offers some insight into the co-presence of determination and indetermination in 
the game of chance played out in the Cagean classroom. Once the dice is thrown and 
chance affirmed there can be no further human intervention or interference in the 
process of this contingent yet fateful originary act and its subsequent unfolding. What 
has happened has happened; it is fixed and absolutely determinate. The only freedom 
(academic or not) is the freedom to affirm this arbitrary determination and accept the 
fixity of the pedagogical situation one finds oneself ‘thrown’ into, to use Heideggerian 
language. And yet, paradoxically, what is determined is indeterminate to the extent that 
it has yet to happen, at least as what Deleuze calls the ‘pure event.’ Of course things 
happen in the classroom—exchanges, discussions, agreements, disagreements, work, 
idleness and so forth—activities that activate the individual participants as actors in a 
pedagogical plot (in both senses), one that fills up what Badiou describes as the ‘void’ 
of the event with the be-lated immediacy and substance of the ‘situation.’35 But such a 
web of competing wills and intentionalities, hell-bent on taking possession of the 
moment (what we nowadays call ‘taking ownership’ of ‘our’ education) fails to learn 
the primary lesson of the event: waiting. Waiting and then accepting. And, prior to that, 
accepting waiting and accepting accepting itself as the evental pedagogical moment. Of 
course, such acceptance is, if misunderstood, highly dangerous, as Adorno makes 
abundantly clear in his promotion of negation above affirmation: 
 
We have to ask what has to be or has not to be affirmed, instead of 
elevating the word ‘Yes’ to a value in itself, as was unfortunately done 
by Nietzsche with the entire pathos of saying yes to life.36  
 
But, to return to the distinction Heidegger makes between decision and choice, while 
Adorno’s advice regarding the specific choices we might make, when affirming this or 
that, is certainly to the point, nevertheless at the decisive level it is irrelevant: how could 
we and why would we say no to life? No to this or that lifestyle perhaps, but to life 
itself? And anyway, there is no sense of what Adorno might mean by ‘life,’ and 
certainly no recognition of the issue being considered here, that is to say, the event of 
life that regardless of our acceptance or rejection of it (whatever that might mean) 
simply happens—has in the past, and will in the future. Judging, critiquing or negating 
life here and now from the perspective of the intentional ego weighed down with the 
baggage of theories, desires, positions and opinions is as pointless as objecting to peanut 
butter. In fact more so, given that life without peanut butter is conceivable, while peanut 
butter without life is not…but we digress. 
 
Together, Nietzsche’s ‘yea-saying,’ Heidegger’s ‘letting-be,’ Deleuze’s affirmation, and 
Cage’s acceptance all recognize one simple but often overlooked fact: that life is not a 
thing or object which we can take ownership of, gain and exchange knowledge of, but 
that, more essentially, life lives, with or without our intervention it lives. Es Gibt in 
German, meaning ‘it is given:’ not by us, not through human intervention and 
interference; it, life gives itself to itself, we only have to accept that incontrovertible 
fact. This explains why Heidegger prefers to use ‘worlding’ rather than world, and why 
Deleuze and Guattari prefer ‘territorialization’ and ‘deterritorialization’ to territory. 
Similarly, Cage’s lifelong promotion of acceptance was never in the name of a static 
objectified given but, rather, the endless attempt to sidestep the entrapment of the world 
within the structures of the experiencing mind, and sense the churning chaos of the 
event. 
 
We have come to desire the experience of what is. But this “what is” is 
neither stable nor unchanging… “what is” doesn’t depend on us, we 
depend on it. And it is for us to approach it. [….] Unfortunately for 
logic, all that we construct under the rubric “logic” represents such a 
simplification relative to the event and to what really happens that we 
must learn to be wary of it. This is the function of art today: to preserve 
us from all those logical minimalizations that we are tempted in each 
instant to apply to the flow of events. To bring us closer to the process 
that is the world.37 
 
If the ‘function of art’ is to bring us closer to the flow of events or (better) the flow of 
the event, then the same should also be able to be said for art education. Crazy or not, 
the collective reportage of disparate information arrived at by chance operations is, as 
suggested, not so different from the increasingly obscured actuality of art education as it 
already exists. Outraged external examiners accepted, it is true that the experimental 
pedagogical methods adopted by Cage are unlikely to find favor with even the most 
radical of today’s educationalists. And it is also true that, outside of art and art 
education, the adoption of such methods would be catastrophic, a fact which has (also 
catastrophically) psyched art educationalists into an inglorious retreat from the essential 
principle of art: ‘the emancipation of contingency.’ In the face of such a retreat, there is 
no better time to re-assert the one essential fact that is being progressively and 
insidiously effaced by the creeping ‘professionalisation’ of art: only artists, art 
educationalists and those able to think ‘from out of’38 art are capable of productively 
playing the game of chance, and only the game of chance will allow us to both think and 
create the event of education. Cage’s life was the enactment of this fact, and Deleuze’s 
life was dedicated to thinking it. 
 
Only thought finds it possible to affirm all chance and make chance 
into an object of affirmation. If one tries to play this game other than in 
thought, nothing happens: and if one tries to produce a result other than 
the work of art, nothing is produced. This game then is reserved for 
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